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# HAIG OPPOSES PLAN FOR NEW BUSH ROLE BUT REAGAN MOVES

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Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, March 24 — Secretary of State Alexander M. Haig Jr. today publicly questioned a White House plan to put Vice President Bush in charge of the Administration's "crisis management" team. Hours later, the Administration named Mr. Bush to the post.

There was no immediate reaction from Mr. Haig, who had seemingly put his prestige on the line in telling a House For-

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eign Affairs subcommittee this morning that he regarded the possibility of Mr. Bush getting the position with "a lack of enthusiasm."

He said then that no decision had been conveyed to him, but if such a move did happen, "this would pose another set of problems." He was not asked by any Congressman to amplify what seemed to be a warning.

Asked this morning if he was satisfied with the current system for handling foreign affairs, Mr. Haig said, "No."

#### 'Evolutionary Process' Continues

"I'm not, simply because it's an evolutionary process that's under way," he said. "A number of practices, procedures, have yet to be formalized and put in place."

The Bush decision was announced by James S. Brady, the White House spokesman, early this evening after reporters had earlier been told by him that the matter had not been resolved and that no further announcements would be made on the issue.

The announcement said that Mr. Bush, as part of the National Security Council system, would "coordinate and control all appropriate federal resources in responding to emergency situations both foreign and domestic."

### A New Post for a Vice President

The announcement said that Mr. Reagan was guided in large measure. by the infact that management of crises has traditionally, and appropriately, been done within the White House.

The post is, however, a new one for Vice Presidents. In the 1950's, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles was the "crisis manager" for President Eisenhower, a fact noted by Mr. Haig this morning when he registered his unhappiness with apparently being bypassed in favor of Mr. Bush.

In a recent years, the chief crisis manager has been the President's national security adviser, but the choice of Mr. Bush was apparently dictated by the White House's desire not to give the position to Richard V. Allen, Mr. Reagan's national security adviser.

No mention was made in the announcement of what role Mr. Haig might play. The personnel for Mr. Bush's committee would be supplied by Mr. Allen's staff, the announcement said.

Mr. Haig's remarks suggested the possibility that he might resign or take some other action if Mr. Bush was given the job. But a department spokesman was authorized to say tonight that Mr. Haig had no intention of resigning.

It was understood that President Reagan decided to go ahead with the choice of Mr. Bush to head the crisis-management team this afternoon after White House aides urged him not to let Mr. Haig's comments remain unchallenged. The President telephoned the decision to Mr. Haig late in the day.

The decision to place Mr. Bush in charge of crisis management followed reports that had circulated for several days that he would be given the same kind of responsibility given to Henry A. Kissinger and Zbigniew Brzezinski when they were national security advisers. Mr. Bush, a former director of Central Intelligence, also headed the American missions to China and the United Nations.

#### Defense Dept. Approves Decision

The announcement of Mr. Bush's appointment was welcomed at the Defense Department. A Pentagon official said that Defense Secretary Caspar W. Weinberger was pleased with the choice and believed that Mr. Bush was "thoroughly knowledgeable and experienced."

Mr. Weinberger was said to believe that this would permit all information and ideas to get to the President without the bias or the State Department, Defense Department, Central Intelligence Agency or any other agency.

He was said to be ignorant of any unhappiness by Mr. Haig with the choice of Mr. Bush.

At the hearing this morning, Representative Dante B. Fascell, Democrat of Florida, the subcommittee chairman, asked Mr. Haig about the press reports that Mr. Bush would "bypass" him. "My instinct tells me that you wouldn't permit that to happen," Mr. Fascell said.

## Haig Tells of 'Lack of Enthusiasm'

"I read with interest and, I suppose, a lack of enthusiasm the same newspaper reports that you referred to," Mr. Haig said. He said that while Mr. Reagan has the "prerogative and obligation" to de-

sign his own national security structure, "I don't think a decision has been made on this issue; at least it has not been discussed with me if one has been made."

In discussing the general problem of handling security and crisis matters, Mr. Haig referred approvingly to the 1950's when President Eisenhower used to meet daily, he said, with Secretary of State Dulles. Mr. Dulles, he said, "was the crisis manager" in handling day-to-day or major problems.

After the Eisenhower Administration, there was a succession of national security advisers who began to play increasingly important roles in coordinating and directing policy during crises. In the Carter Administration, Vice President Mondale was used extensively in foreign affairs matters but did not have a regular assignment to coordinate policies.

#### Role of Advisers Described

This morning, Mr. Haig seemed to criticize the prominent role being played in foreign affairs by Mr. Reagan's close advisers, such as Edwin Meese 3d, the White House counselor, and James A. Baker, the chief of staff, as well as Mr. Allen.

He said that whatever structure was finally approved for dealing with foreign affairs and national security issues, "It has got to have the imprimatur and reflect the desires of the President, who is the elected official who is held responsible by the people for these matters."

"Next to that, of course, are those officials who have undergone the confirmation process with the legislature and who traditionally the American people have held responsible under that process," he said, seeming to drop the advisers, who are not subject to confirmation, to a more lowly status.

Mr. Haig also indicated that he wanted the State Department to play an increasingly important role in directing foreign trade policies, even though that would seem to bring it into conflict with the office of the Special Trade Representative, Bill Brock.

"There is an overlap, if you will, a joint responsibility between Mr. Brock and myself," he said. "I lean heavily on fundamental policy, and the linkage and the relationship of our conduct of our affairs with another nation, and he must pull together the essentially domestic constituencies on a given trade issue."

Mr. Haig's aides have also been unhappy with Mr. Allen's seeming ability to play a direct role in policy making even though Mr. Haig had earlier understood that Mr. Allen would only be a personal staff aide to Mr. Reagan and not be in a position to interject himself into a decision.